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particular attention; announcing a prospective
rise in the retirement age would not only ease
pension burdens, but would also increase poten-
tial labor supply. Designing reforms that are
resilient to uncertainties about the future is
clearly a very difficult task. However, one way
that uncertainties about life expectancy could be
dealt with in pension systems would be to link
increases in the retirement age to gains in life
expectancy or to link pension benefits to life
expectancy (as in Sweden). Lastly, aging may
have important implications for financial mar-
kets if the elderly run down their assets in retire-
ment, and regulators will need to ensure that
financial systems are sufficiently resilient to cope
with such possible changes (see the September
2004 Global Financial Stability Report).
The policy response to demographic change
in developing countries has received less atten-
tion, but is very important, particularly as these
countries will become an increasingly significant
source of global growth in the period ahead.
The main priorities for developing countries are
to put in place a policy framework that ensures
that the potential benefits from the demo-
graphic dividend are maximized, while setting
the groundwork for eventual population aging.
Pension and health care systems will need to be
strengthened to ensure that they provide a safety
net for the elderly that is both adequate and fis-
cally sustainable. In doing this, it will be impor-
tant that governments learn from the current
situation in many advanced countries, and do
not commit themselves to provide benefits that
will be difficult to finance.
The movement of goods, capital, and labor
between countries will be an integral part of the
global adjustment to the differential rates of
population aging. Choices will need to be made
about how these channels are allowed to oper-
ate, with policymakers having to balance the eco-
nomic, political, and social implications of each.
The more the adjustment is shared between the
various channels, however, the less will be the
burden on each, and this may help reduce the
risks that could accompany large capital flows. At
the international level, increased cooperation
will be needed to manage these cross-country
flows and to ensure that the associated risks are
minimized to the extent possible. In this regard,
progress toward freer trade—including through
the successful completion of the ongoing Doha
Round—and the strengthening of the global
financial architecture will be important.
Finally, some of the policies to tackle the
impact of demographic change will inevitably
involve difficult tradeoffs, will take time to
agree and implement, and will need to be
phased in to allow people sufficient time to
adjust their behavior. This is most clearly true
of pension reforms—which affect the welfare of
the elderly and threaten benefits that people
believe they are entitled to—but also of health
care. Therefore, while the full impact of demo-
graphic change will not be felt in most coun-
tries for a number of years, the process of
planning a response should not be delayed.
This is particularly true for advanced countries,
where reforms to pension and health care
systems will become increasingly difficult to
implement as populations age. Policymakers
therefore need to take advantage of the current
strong global economic rebound to advance the
reform agenda before the window of opportu-
nity begins to close.
Appendix 3.1. Demographic Change
and the Global Economy: Data and
Modeling Strategy
The main authors of this appendix are Nicoletta
Batini, the INGENUE Team, Warwick McKibbin,
Nicola Spatafora, and Mehmet Tosun.
This appendix provides further details on the
data and the modeling strategy used in the chap-
ter to analyze the global economic impact of
demographic change.
Econometric Analysis
The econometric work analyzes a broad panel
of 115 advanced and developing countries, rep-
resenting all major geographic regions, over the
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period 1960–2000.37 For all variables, and for
each country, the data are averaged over each
decade. The analysis focuses on the impact of
demographic change on each of the following
measures of macroeconomic performance:
growth of GDP per capita; saving/GDP; invest-
ment/GDP; current account balance/GDP; and
central government budget balance/GDP.
Demographic change is measured using the
following variables:
• ratio of working-age population to total popu-
lation, and ratio of elderly population to total
population, when analyzing any measure of
macroeconomic performance except growth
of GDP per capita;38 and
• change in the ratio of working-age population
to total population, and change in the ratio of
elderly population to total population, when
analyzing growth of GDP per capita.
Summary statistics for the key variables used
in the analysis are shown in Table 3.2. To exam-
ine the importance of demographic change as a
determinant of economic performance, the fol-
lowing equation was estimated:
Yit = αi + β ·Demoit + γ ·Ζit + εit, (1)
where Y is the specific macroeconomic variable
of interest; Demo are the relevant measures of
demographic change; Z is a set of control vari-
ables; and the subscripts i and t denote the
country and the time period, respectively. This
equation is estimated using the panel fixed-
effects estimator. More specifically:
• in the growth regression, the controls include
initial income; secondary school enrollment
ratios; investment/GDP; budget balance/GDP;
inflation rate; external trade/GDP; and coun-
try risk (as measured by the ICRG);
• in the regressions for saving/GDP, investment/
GDP, and current account/GDP, the controls
include initial income; budget balance/GDP;
net foreign assets/GDP; M2/GDP; the stan-
dard deviation of a terms of trade index;
external trade/GDP; and an oil-producer
dummy; and
• in the budget balance regression, the controls
include initial income; the standard deviation
of the terms of trade; and external trade/GDP.
To control for possible endogeneity problems,
all demographic variables, as well as several other
controls, are instrumented using their lagged val-
ues (for all decades except the first, the lagged
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Table 3.2. Selected Summary Statistics, 1960–20001
(Percent unless otherwise noted)
All Sample 
Variable Countries
Economic variables
Output growth per capita 1.7 (6.3)
Saving/GDP 16.9 (15.0)
Investment/GDP 21.8 (8.4)
Current account/GDP –4.1 (10.4)
Budget balance/GDP –3.4 (7.0)
Demographic variables
Working-age population/total population 57.4 (6.3)
Elderly population/total population 5.7 (3.8)
Change in (working-age population/total population)2 0.11 (0.32)
Change in (elderly population/total population)2 0.05 (0.11)
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators; United Nations,
World Population Prospects: 2002 Revision; and IMF staff calculations.
1Values are means at an annual frequency, with panel standard deviations
provided in parentheses next to each value.
2Percentage points.
37These countries are Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados,
Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep. of, Congo, Rep. of, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, The
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Iran, I.R. of, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Rep.,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
38The working-age population is defined as the age group 15–64 inclusive; the elderly population is defined as the age
group 65 years of age and older. When analyzing the determinants of the current account, demographic variables for each
country are expressed as deviations from the world average.
value is defined as the value in the preceding
decade; for the first decade, the lagged value is
defined as the value in the first year).39
Macroeconomic Models
This section describes in more detail the three
multiple generations models (MGM) used in
this chapter.40 Table 3.3 summarizes and con-
trasts the key features of each model.
The INGENUE Model
The INGENUE model (INGENUE Team,
2001) is a multiregion world model in the spirit
of those developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996) in which the structure of each regional
economy is similar to that of other applied OLG
general equilibrium models such as Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987) or Cazes and others (1992,
1994), except that labor supply is exogenous.41
The world is divided into six regions, includ-
ing three advanced areas (Europe, North
America, and Japan) and three developing coun-
try zones ranked according to their stage in the
demographic transition (a “rapidly aging,” a
“moderately aging,” and a “slowly aging” zone)
(Table 3.4). Each region of the world comprises
three categories of economic agents: house-
holds, firms, and the public sector. These are
described below.
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Table 3.3. Main Characteristics of the Multiple-Generations Models
Characteristic INGENUE Tosun MSG3
Number of countries/blocks1 6 2 4
Intertemporal optimization/
overlapping generations Yes Yes Yes
Expectations Rational Rational Rational and rule of thumb
Sectors 1 1 3
Age cohorts 4 young, 15 adult (including elderly) 0 young, 1 adult, 1 elderly 1 young,1 adult (including elderly)
Period lengths (years) 5 30 1
Life ends at Fixed at 60–94 years Fixed at 60 years Fixed with probability “p”
Rigidities No No Yes
Capital mobility Yes Yes Yes
Labor mobility No Yes No
Intergenerational transfers Adults to young Adults to elderly Adults to young
Adults to elderly
Public sector Yes (simple public pension scheme) Yes (articulated with public Yes (articulated without public
pension scheme) pension scheme)
1INGENUE regions include (1) Western Europe; (2) North America: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States; (3) Japan; (4)
developing rapidly aging countries; (5) developing moderately aging countries; and (6) developing slowly aging countries. Tosun’s model’s
regions include an advanced and a developing country bloc. MSG3 regions include (1) the United States; (2) Japan; (3) other OECD economies;
and (4) rest of the world.
39Specifically, secondary school enrollment ratios; investment/GDP; budget balance/GDP; inflation rate; external
trade/GDP; and country risk.
40Multiple generations models were first proposed by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). In their purest overlap-
ping-generations (OLG) form, these innovate upon the Ramsey infinitely-lived representative-consumer hypothesis by
introducing at each point in time individuals of different generations. Work by Blanchard (1985), Buiter (1988), Weil
(1989), and more recently Faruqee (2000a, 2000b, 2003) suggested simplified alternatives to pure OLG models.
Multicountry extensions in the OLG tradition include Buiter (1981), Cutler and others (1990), Attanasio and Violante
(2000), INGENUE Team (2001), Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2003), and Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2003),
among others. Faruqee, Laxton, and Symanski (1997), and Bryant and McKibbin (2004) all proposed multicountry exten-
sions in the Blanchard-Buiter-Weil multiple-generations-model tradition.
41A new, more sophisticated version of the INGENUE model with 10 regions, imperfect financial markets, 2 sectors,
autonomous population projections based upon UN coefficient methods, stochastic life expectancy, and bequest motives is
currently under construction.
Households
In each region the household sector consists of
15 overlapping five-year-long cohorts of adults
aged 20–94, and four cohorts of “young” who are
dependent on their parents: individuals become
adults when they turn 20, and remain in the labor
force until legal, mandatory retirement age,
which differs according to the region. Death
occurs with certainty between ages 60 and 94, but
is modeled in a way that mimics realistic proba-
bilistic assumptions for the various world regions.
Households are assumed to supply labor,
inelastically and locally, during the first periods
of their adult life (youth and maturity) and then
to retire. In addition, young adults bear the costs
of educating children, modeled as a “tax” on the
parent’s consumption, proportional to the num-
ber of births. Households maximize life-cycle util-
ity, with perfect foresight: when working, they
save and invest in shares of the capital stock of
production firms that are sold on a unified world
capital market to finance their consumption dur-
ing retirement—when they dissave. There is no
bequest motive so at the end of each household’s
life each household’s cumulated saving is zero.
Firms
The model assumes that identical firms
located in various regions of the world are per-
fectly competitive, are equipped with a Cobb-
Douglas constant-return technology using two
factors (capital and labor), and produce a single
good that may be used for consumption and
investment. In the model this good is used as a
numeraire and is freely traded at no cost on a
world market. The assumption of a single good
traded at no cost in world markets implies that
regional real exchange rates are constant and
always equal to one. In the model, capital is also
perfectly mobile and the world financial market
is perfect so that, in the long run, regional inter-
est rates are equalized. Although the production
technology is assumed to be identical across
regions, the model is simulated assuming a wide
initial gap in the level of total factor productivity
between regions, which in turn is driven by an
exogenous growth and convergence process. A
mechanism of exogenous international diffusion
of technological progress is specified, whereby
the various regions of the world slowly converge
to the level of total factor productivity in the
North American economy—the world’s techno-
logical leader—so that in the very long run all
regions grow at the same rate.
Public Sector
The public sector is reduced to a pay-as-you-go
public pension scheme. It is financed by a pay-
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Table 3.4. INGENUE Model: Countries Composing Each Demographic Zone
Name of Region Countries in Region
Western Europe European Union, Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland
North America and Oceania United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
Japan Japan
Developing: rapidly aging Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia,
Georgia, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Korea, Dem. People’s Rep., Korea, Rep. of., Latvia, Lithuania,
Macao, Moldova, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Thailand,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, and Uruguay.
Developing: moderately aging Albania, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Brazil, Brunei, Caribbean zone, Chile, Colombia, Dominica,
Guyana, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Sri
Lanka, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, and Vietnam.
Developing: slowly aging Afghanistan, Africa, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Islamic Rep. of., Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR,
Melanesia, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Philippines, Polynesia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Eastern Timor, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen, Rep. of.
roll tax on all labor incomes and pays pensions
to retired households. The replacement rate on
the after tax wage is fixed, and the payroll tax is
endogenous in order to enforce a balanced-
budget rule. The adopted calibration allows the
model to reproduce realistic regional intergen-
erational transfers.
Equilibrium
The general equilibrium of the world econ-
omy is solved by equating, in each region, the
optimal labor demand emanating from domestic
firms to the exogenous local labor supply, and
the sum of regional supplies of saving with the
sum of regional demand for investment. These
equilibrium conditions respectively yield the six
regional real wage rates and the world real inter-
est rate, which in turn determine regional GDP,
aggregate consumption, and saving, as well as
their distribution over living cohorts in the vari-
ous regions. In any given period, the difference
between the flows of domestic saving and domes-
tic investment in any of the six regions gives the
inflow or outflow of the capital for the region,
while the ratio of the stock of accumulated
wealth of resident households to the stock of
accumulated productive capital in a particular
region, defined as the ownership ratio, measures
its net external position—that is, net foreign
assets or net external debt.
Calibration
Fertility rates and households’ life expectancy
in the model are set to mimic demographic pro-
jections from the UN’s medium-fertility scenario
up to 2050. The evolution of regional popula-
tions beyond that date is obtained by setting
reproduction rates so that populations become
stationary after 2100. Parameter values govern-
ing households’ and firms’ behavior together
with assumptions on exogenous growth rates,
the degree of international technological con-
vergence, and contribution and replacement
rates for pension schemes in the various regions
of the world are based on historical data in
order to match as closely as possible the
observed dynamic of key economic variables,
notably current account balances and interest
rates.
MSG3 Model
The MSG3 model is a three-sector—energy,
nonenergy, and capital-producing—version of
the G-Cubed model developed by McKibbin and
Wilcoxen (1998) building on the earlier MSG2
model developed by McKibbin and Sachs (1989)
and the Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) model.
The model divides the world into four regions:
the United States, Japan, the rest of the OECD,
and the rest of the world (in essence, the world’s
developing bloc). It combines the modern
intertemporal optimization approach to model-
ing economic behavior (as found in Blanchard
and Fischer, 1989; and Obstfeld and Rogoff,
1996) with short-run rule-of-thumb behavior. In
doing this it brings together features of real
business cycle models—with a fully articulated
analysis of forward-looking producers and
consumers—and modern macroeconometric
models—describing the effects of demand down-
turns in the face of wage (and price) stickiness.
The main features of the model are as follows.
• Demographics. The model includes demo-
graphic considerations, such that economic
agents in the model possess finite life spans
and their income varies as they age.
Specifically, drawing heavily on Faruqee
(2000a, 2000b), who extended the Blanchard
(1985) model of finitely lived agents to
include aging considerations, in the MSG3
economic agents progress from being finan-
cially dependent children to being adults who
are financially responsible for their own chil-
dren. Death occurs with a fixed probability.
• Explicit optimization. The model is based on
explicit intertemporal optimization by agents
(consumers and firms) in each economy.
Thus, time and dynamics are of fundamental
importance in the MSG3 model, making its
core theoretical structure like that of real busi-
ness cycle models.
• Rule-of-thumb agents. To track the inertial
dynamics of some key macroeconomic vari-
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ables, the behavior of agents is modified to
allow for short-run deviations from optimal
behavior, owing either to myopia or to restric-
tions on the ability of households and firms to
borrow at the risk-free bond rate on govern-
ment debt.
• Cash-in-advance constraints. Holdings of finan-
cial assets including money are explicitly mod-
eled. In particular, money is introduced into
the model through a restriction that house-
holds require money to purchase goods.
• Nominal rigidities. The model allows for short-
run nominal wage rigidity (by different
degrees in different countries) and therefore
allows for protracted periods of unemploy-
ment depending on the labor market institu-
tions in each country.
• Two types of capital. The model distinguishes
between the stickiness of physical capital
within sectors and within countries and the
flexibility of financial capital that can flow
immediately where expected returns are high-
est. This distinction leads to a difference
between the quantity of physical capital that is
available at any time to produce goods and
services and the valuation of that capital as a
result of decisions about the geographical allo-
cation of financial capital.
• Estimation/calibration. Key parameters in the
model—such as the elasticities of substitution
in production and consumption decisions—
are estimated, enhancing the model’s ability
to reproduce the dynamics of historical data.
As a result, the model exhibits a rich dynamic
behavior, driven on the one hand by asset accu-
mulation and, on the other hand, by wage
adjustment to a neoclassical steady state. Details
of the model can be found on the Internet at
www.gcubed.com.
Tosun’s Two-Region OLG Model with
International Labor Mobility
This two-period two-country model builds on
the standard closed-economy overlapping gener-
ations framework developed by Diamond
(1965). The model features either capital or
labor mobility in line with work by Galor (1986,
1992) and Crettez, Michel, and Vidal (1996,
1998). In the version used here the two coun-
tries represent the advanced and developing
regions of the world, each with a population that
is composed of two age groups (workers and the
retired). The population characteristics of each
country are calibrated to actual UN projections
for advanced and developing blocs of the world
so that the advanced countries age more quickly
than the developing countries. The model incor-
porates the interaction of household behavior,
firm behavior, political process, and interna-
tional labor flows. These are described in more
detail below.
Households
Individuals live for two (30-year-long) periods
and seek to maximize the utility that they derive
from consumption over their lifetime. To pay for
consumption, households supply labor accord-
ing to a distribution of abilities that is replicated
in each new generation. Effective labor is the
product of human capital that is accumulated
from the interaction of the ability level of the
individual and government spending per young
on a productivity-enhancing public good such as
education. Both labor and capital income are
taxed to finance the provision of public goods.
Firms
Each country produces a single good using a
Cobb-Douglas technology. Competitive factor
markets require that the real wage and the real
interest rate are equalized to the marginal prod-
uct of labor and capital, respectively.
Political process
The government provides two public goods: a
productivity-enhancing good (education) and
social security. It is assumed that there is a pre-
determined “earmarked” level of social security
spending. Thus the social security tax is simply
determined by the government budget con-
straint where social security spending per worker
is fixed. However, spending on the productivity-
enhancing public good is determined through a
political process for which a median-voter frame-
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work with voter heterogeneity is used. Voter
heterogeneity is introduced by assuming a distri-
bution of genetic ability levels for the working
generation. The ability level of the individual
will, in turn, determine the value that the indi-
vidual receives from the public good.
The preferred tax rate is increasing with the
ability level of the individual and with income
per worker and it is decreasing with the social
security tax rate. Since retirees do not derive any
benefit from this public good, they incur a cost
without enjoying any benefits. Therefore, their
preferred tax rate will always be zero, regardless
of their ability. With an increase in the depend-
ency ratio, retired people will need fewer work-
ing voters to form a majority. Since these
working voters are at the lower end of the ability
distribution, they prefer lower taxes than higher-
ability people because their return from the
productivity-enhancing public good is lower.
Therefore, the median voter becomes a person
with lower ability and the preferred tax rate of
the median voter falls. The migration of workers
increases the number of working voters, the
upshot of which is a higher preferred tax rate of
the median voter, and thus a larger provision of
productivity-enhancing good. In turn, this sup-
ports labor income and growth relative to a sce-
nario of aging where no migration takes place.
Equilibrium
In the absence of international capital mobil-
ity, capital market equilibrium requires that sav-
ing in each period equals accumulated capital in
the following period. Two alternatives are also
contemplated to close the dynamic model.
Either capital is fully mobile internationally (so
that rates of return are equalized between the
two countries) or labor is perfectly mobile
between the two countries (so that net-of-tax real
wages are equalized across countries, given that
the model uses source-based income taxation for
both countries).
In the case of perfect labor mobility, it is assum-
ed that only people of working age move between
regions. Additionally, migration is assumed to
have no effect on the ability distribution in both
regions. This means that migration of labor
affects the size rather than the composition of
the working-age generation in the two regions.
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